Facts
In 2012, a same-sex couple visited Masterpiece Cakeshop with
the intention of ordering and purchasing a cake for their wedding. The owner of the shop told the couple that he
would not make the cake due to personal religious objections—he would not make
a cake for a same-sex marriage. A discrimination
charge was filed based on sexual orientation in accordance with Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Act.
Procedural History
Opinion
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and BREYER, ALITO, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.
There are two main issues at the heart of the case: (1) the
authority of a State and its governmental entities to protect the rights and
dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but who face discrimination
when they seek goods or services, and (2) the right of all persons to exercise
fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment, as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The reason and motive for the baker’s refusal were based on
his sincere religious beliefs and convictions. The Court’s precedents make
clear that the baker, in his capacity as the owner of a business serving the
public, might have his right to the free exercise of religion limited by
generally applicable laws. Still, the delicate question of when the free
exercise of his religion must yield to an otherwise valid exercise of state
power needed to be determined in an adjudication in which religious hostility on
the part of the State itself would not be a factor in the balance the State
sought to reach. That requirement, however, was not met here. When the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission considered this case, it did not do so with the
religious neutrality that the Constitution requires.
Given all these considerations, it is proper to hold that
whatever the outcome of some future controversy involving facts similar to
these, the Commission’s actions here violated the Free Exercise Clause; and its
order must be set aside.
The Commission’s hostility was inconsistent with the First
Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied in manner that is neutral toward
religion. Phillips was entitled to a neutral decision maker who would give full
and fair consideration to his religious objection as he sought to assert it in
all of the circumstances in which this case was presented, considered, and
decided. In this case the adjudication concerned a context that may well be
different going forward in the respects noted above. However later cases
raising these or similar concerns are resolved in the future, for these reasons
the rulings of the Commission and of the state court that enforced the
Commission’s order must be invalidated.
The judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined.
Statements made at the Commission’s public hearings on
Phillips’ case provide no firmer support for the Court’s holding today.
Whatever one may think of the statements in historical context, I see no reason
why the comments of one or two Commissioners should be taken to overcome
Phillips’ refusal to sell a wedding cake to Craig and Mullins. The proceedings
involved several layers of independent decision-making, of which the Commission
was but one. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a–6a. First, the Division had to find
probable cause that Phillips violated CADA. Second, the ALJ entertained the
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Third, the Commission heard
Phillips’ appeal. Fourth, after the Commission’s ruling, the Colorado Court of
Appeals considered the case de novo. What prejudice infected the determinations
of the adjudicators in the case before and after the Commission? The Court does
not say. Phillips’ case is thus far removed from the only precedent upon which
the Court relies, Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993),where the government action that
violated a principle of religious neutrality implicated a sole decision making
body, the city council, see id., at
526–528.
For the reasons stated, sensible application of CADA to a
refusal to sell any wedding cake to a gay couple should occasion affirmance of
the Colorado Court of Appeals’ judgment. I would so rule.
